First, the implementation problem is outlined, The use of indicators and operational targets as an aid in implenlenting policy is then discussed. Next, two hypotheses about the way in which the Federal Reserve's policy actions are transmitted through the economic system are presented. Finally, this framework is used to illustrate how alternative policy prescriptions can develop.
The Implementation Problem
The mnonetasy policy process consists of two broad phases. The policymakers must first decide upon the movements they desire to achieve in their ultimate policy objectives such as prices, output, and employment. Second, they nlust decide how to manipulate policy instruments such as open market operations, reserve requirements, ann the rliscount rate to achieve these desired effects on their ultimate objectives. This is the impienlentation phase of policy.
To analyze the implementation problem we shall use the physical analogy' of heating a rdlom Ivitil a steam furnace. First, let us set up the heating system, as shown in Exhibit 1. Our policymaker is Mr. Homeowner, His policy problem is to maintain the temperalure in his house at a comfortable level, He uses his room thermometer to give him a measurement of whether the room temperature is moving in the direction he desires (the room is getting hotter or colder).
The means by which he implements a decision to change the room temperature is to adjust the fuel control lever. If, for example, lIe wants the room temperature to rise, he adjusts the fuel control level to increase the flow of fuel to the furnace, lie then judges whether he has correctly adjusted tile fuel lever by watching the room thermometer. He knows there is a lag betweeml the time he adjusts the fuel control lever and when the room temperature begins to rise. Taking this lag mto account, if the reading on the room tilermonleter does not rise sufficiently, he wouid again adjust the fuel control lever.
result.
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It is worth emphasizing that the goal of Mr. Homeowner isad:onlfortable room tn'nsperature, not some reading on the thermometer. The themnlomlleter is only a device that helps him to monitor the heating process.
l-Iowever, let us assuusle that Mr. Homeowner has an old furnace, and! he is not confident that it works exactly the way the manufacturer claislls it should. I-Ic installs two mtermnediate gauges to lsc'lp him in his control process; -a fuel flow gauge to monitrlr the flow of fuel between the fuel supply and the furnace, and a steam pressure gauge on the furnace to monitor the operation of the furnace. For example, the fuel flow gauge helps the isomeowner check for leaks in the fuel line. If this gauge registers a leak, then the homeowner knows that the fuel flow must be increased to maintain the same heat from the furnace.
Monetary Policy
Now-let us convert this discussion into an analogy with the implementation problem of monetary policy. The fuel control lever becomes the policy instruments of the Federal Reserve; open market operations, reserve requirements, and the discount rate. The furnace becomes the financial system, and the room becomes the real sector of the economy. Mr. Hosneowner becomes tile Federal Open Market Comsnittee, and the policy objective becomes something such as enlploynment, prices, and real output, instead of room tenlpenatule. The rooiIl thermonseter becomes a measuring instrunlent such as tlse unempioyment rate, consumer price index, and GNP in constant pnces.
Monetary policy implementation would be much easier if there were complete information about the way in which policy instruments, financial variables, and real variables are interrelated. It would only involve manipulating the policy instruments in a way that would have a known and desired effect on the levels and rates of change of the ultimate objectives of monetary policy. Just as our homeowner, with complete information about how his furnace operates, would know where to set the fuel control lever to get the desired room temperature, the policymakers would know how close, by manipulating the pohcy instruments, they could come to achieving their desired ultimate policy objectives. There would be no possibility of a "slip twixt cup and lip." The policy instruments could simply be set at definite values, and the desired goals of policy would be achieved subject to any constraints.
Indicators and Operational Targets
The indicator-operational target approach is a pragmatic mnethnni of impro\-immg the implementation of monetasy policy. It starts with tile fact that n~one has perfect infom'mnation about thd-way policy actions filter through the econosny, are mnon!ifieci by other factors, and ultimately influeslce real output, prices, ann! employment. Econorslie research, however, has provinled sossle theoretical andl empirical information about these linkages. The indicator-operational target approach attempts to employ this information to guide the process by which policy is implesnented.
Policymakers are concerned with two major questions when implementing policy. First, what effects are monetary influences exerting on the ultimate policy objectives? Are monetary influences exerting a more, a less, or an unchanged expansionary influence on the future rates of change of prices-and employment? An indicator provides information about this question. Second, pohcymakers want to know how they should manipulate their policy instruments to insure that monetary influences are modified to continue exerting the effect desired by the policynlakcrs, An operational target provides a method for answering this second question.
In.dzcators
A nmonr'tam-v policy indicator is an economic variable that provides inforrmuation about the current thrust of the financial sector. inclunling Federal Reserve actions, on future nlovemneslts in the ultunate policy objectives. Enspirical evinlenee confirms tilat tile effect of monetary' polic~'actions on the ultisnate policy objectives is distributedl over tulle. i-ience, the Federal Besem'vn' cannot accurately jud!ge tile degree of ease or "restraint" its current policy actions am'e exerting on the uitimate olijectives of policy liy looking directly at measuring instruments such as the consumer price mdcx and the unemployment rate. Current changes in the ultimate objectives primarily reflect the effects of policy actions taken in previous periods.
A further point must lie clarifier!. Pohcvmakers nb not need an indicator to tell them their current intent of policy. They know what they-intenn! to accomplish with their pohcv actions, tm Pohevmakers
Since the intent of cunresmt policy is not made public until about 90 days alter the FOMC Meeting tn the "Record of Policy Actions of the P0MG" appearing in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, a measure of policy intent may lie of interest to market participants. l-lowever, this is a dill enent probiens frostms tile one with winch this article is concerned.
want inforimmation about the immfluence their past pohey actions-are exerting on the futurc-course of the econonmy.
The cimoice of an indlicator imvolves choosmg some financial variable that cosmsistentlv provides reliable information about time cum'rent infiuence of time financial sector, inclsmding Federal Reserve actions, on future ec'ononmic activity. In gemmeral termmms, timis recluires that the following relationship imoids between time indicator and the ultnnate policy objectives;
A change in time rssagaitunle of the indicator is followed in' a predictable eisammge imm time ntmagniLudle of the ultimate rslmjectives of nmommetary policy.
An economic variable that meets time above criterion can serve as a "scale" that pernmits policy advisers to mmmake meaningful statemsmesmts about the relative effects of different policy actions on the ultimate policy objectives. It provides a means of relative commlparisiOn of c!ifferemmt sets of policy actions; not necessarily an absolute means of conmparison.
The usefulness of an indicator hinges on \vhether or not it consistently supplies reliable infornmation to the policynmakers. If at tunes the ultimnate policy' objectives nmove in a direction opposite to the direction predicted using a given indicator, then in such instances the indicator provides false information to the policyssmakers about the thrust of their policy actions on time uitissmate objectives of monetary pdlhcy.
Operational Targets
Aim operatiommal target for mmmonetary policy' is an eeommomic \-ariahle the Fen!erai Reserve attesmmpts to control directly iii its day--to-day usoney ssmarket operations. F'ollowing eacim Fedem-ai Opesi Market Comsnittee ( FOMC ) smmeetismg, the Conmmnsittee issues a directive tdl time New' lork Fenleral Reserve Bank. Time dav-to-n!ay' imnplemnentation of open mmmarket operatiomms is arried out by time Tradling Desk at time New Yom'k Bank. In gesmerai, these directives have trar!itiosmaily been worded in broad terms sucis as;
...smmaimmtain the prevaiismg firns com di tiosms imm time msmommev asmnl short-term credit nmsmrkets.
Although flue c!ireeth-e mmmay appear to be worded in sosmmewimat ambiguous ternms, the Trading Desk does not rannionmiy buy' amid! sell securities. It chooses sonme financial varialiie or variables to control and aimmms its day-to-da~-operatiorss in the nmoney nmarket at controlling this operatiorsai target. Timc-operatiommai In our furnace analogs', the operatiommai target beconmes tim' fuel supply'. Aim immmdieator is a gauge set in the process by-wimich mmmonetary pohey-ac tiosms are transsmmitted to time real sector of time econorsmy. Usually time indicator is "attacimed'' to time financial sector. It givc's the Federal Reserve a readimmg omm Imow munch of the fuel timey are supply'ismg ( timrougim olmemm ssmarket operations. reserve requiremmmesmts and the discdlunt mate) is being converted ismto emmerg~' to rh-n-c the ccOilo mmmv
Tsvo ilypotheses
Time lack of dollspletc-immforsmmatiors aimout time way' pdliicv actiomis are trammsnmittedi to ultinmatc' olmjec-tn-es requires timc-formmsuiation (IF proposed explanations imvpotimeses ) about time proee~. A persosm's choice of amm indicator asmd atm operational target usually depemmdis tm~mrImm hull imypothesis aimout the way policy actions am'e trasmsmmmitten! througim time fimmammcial sector into time real sector. Disagreesmment amimong economists as to time appropriate clmoicc-of atm immdicator and operational target is basically a disagreemmment as to time correct represemmtatiosm of time mosmetary policy tr-anssmmissiomm muecimanismmm.tm Two frequentiy used hypotheses about the transmnission process of nmonetaiy policy, the Market Interest Rate Hypotimesis and the Money Supply Hypotimesis, are coimmpared in Exhibit II. Time policy instrummmenmts and uhtinmmate objectives available to pohey'-nmakers are the samne regardless of whetimer they use one of fimese hypotimeses or any' other imypothesis about the tm'anssimission process. There nmay he differences hmetween advocates of the two hypotheses, imowever, concerning the relative imnportance of different policy instrummments and ultinmate objectives. 3
In the Market Interest Rate Hypothesis, the indicator is mmmarket interest rates. An eeononmic variable such as free reserves (referred to as net borrowed reserves when borrowings exceed excess reserves) is generally chosen as the operational target. In a broader context, free reserves can he viewed as a substitute for a number of simort-tenmm money immarket factors, such as time Federal funds rate, "tone and feel of the mnarket," and the Treasury bill rate. In the Money Supply Hypothesis, the indicator is the growtis rate of the mooney stock (currency-plus demmmand deposits of time nonbasmk public). A second area of disagreeoment can c!eveiop about the mmmanner inm wimic-Im time flow of fuel frommm time Federal Reserve is converted into a flosv of total s 1 mending. Supporters of the Money Supply II~pothesis contend that an increased flow of base smmcmmmey' inmto time fismanciai sector is converted! immto an immc-reaseci growtim of time smmoney stock, whieim results imm aim increased! flow of total s 1 mendmimg, immfluesmcing emmm 1 mioy'nmemmt, prices, and real outimut. Time altenmative view' is timat an increased ievel of free reserves is eosmverted! iim time financial seetnmr immto lower smmarket immterest rates. wimich result its aim immcreasecl flow' of tmtai spendhmmg and imemmce real varialmies arc' iimfluerneeni. In our analogy, this diuestion mmmay-ime imimrasedl, "hdmw' is fuel cormverted irmto energy that drives time ecoimoomy?" Su 1 mpom'ters of time-two lmy'potimeses are mommitoring time progm-ess of 1 molicy-by' diffc'rent gauges, wlmere timd' gauges am'e attachmed to time samsme part of time imrocess. Siimce time grmwtlm of tlmc' smmosmey-stock and sssarket niterest rates fredjuentim,' nmmos'e in timc' sanme dlired-tiotss. siilmstaimtial dim'ergesmces tmf opinioim oftesm arise regardimmg time correct jmohcy' action tcm take to ac-imieve time sasisc-ultimate obmjc'e-tive. observe that market rates are rising. If they desire no change in the influence of policy, they may conclude that the flow of fuel to the financial sector vill not be converted into enough energy (low market rates) to maintain the rate of growth of real output and employment they desire. Hence, they would advise that policy instruments be used to raise the level of free reserves (pump in more fuel).
However, let us assume that the supporters of the Money Supply Hypothesis look at their indicator and observe that the growth rate of money is accelerating. They conclude that the fuel being supplied by Federal Reserve actions would be converted into a~og-ressively more rapid flow of total spending, and they advise that the policy instruments should be used to slow the growth of the base (pump in fuel at a slower rate).
At this point a substantial divergence of opinion about the reason for the change in market interest rates arises between the supporters of the two hypotheses. This difference of analysis has important implications for the conduct of monetary policy. The supporters of the Market Interest Rate Hypothesis contend that Federal Reserve policy actions are dontmating the movements in interest rates and that the rise in market rates will result in a s1owdown in the real economic activity. The supporters of the Money Supply Hypothesis, however, contend that changes in the public's demand for credit are dominafing movements in market interest rates and that Federal Reserve actions through their influence on total spending are influencing the public's demand for credit. In terms of our analogy, the Money Supply Hypothesis asserts that the market interest rate indicator is not insulated 1mm developments in the real sector. As the real sector heats up (employment, real output, and prices rise), this influences the readings on the market interest rate indicator.
To analyze the importance of this difference of analysis, we shall first discuss the interdependence of free reserves and the base. Then the implications for monetary policy of this interdependence are examined. irs the following presentation, the net source base is used, and hereafter when the terms "base money" or "base" are used, they will refer to net source base. The same results may be derived by using the monetary base or source base.
Interdependence
Free reserves are calculated by subtracting member bank borrowings from member bank excess reserves.
MARCH 1971
One of the components of the source base on the uses side of the balance sheet is member bank excess reserves. The net source base is obtained by subtracting member bank borrowings from the source base. Therefore, the components of the net source base may be combined so that free reserves is one of the uses of the net source base.°If the Federal Reserve alters the level of free reserves, and if currency held by the public and vault cash in nonmember banks are held constant, the net source base is changed in the same direction. Free reserves and the net source base are not independent of each other. Actions taken by the Federal Reserve to alter or maintain the existing value of one of these operational targets exert an influence on the other.
To analyze the importance of this interdependence, the bank credit market is introduced. Supply and demand conditions in this market are specified as follows:
aS = S = ccnnmerc'ial banks' supply schedule for bank credit 1) = public's demand schedule for bank credit
The equilibrium condition for the bank credit market is given as: S=D (Amount of credit banks are willing to supply = amount of bank credit demanded by the public).
In the above expression, (a) denotes the bank credit multiplier, which is the connecting link between the amount of net source base (B) and the amount of credit banks are willing to extend.'°l n this article, the net source base is denoted by B. Generally this concept is denoted as B'. The superscript has been removed to avoid any confusion that might arise when the bank's credit supply curve is specified later. The public's demand for bank credit and the bank's credit supply also depend upon a number of other factors. For example. the public's demand for credit depends upon the expected rate of return on real capital and upon price expectations. The banks' supply of credit depends upon the amount and rate of growth of the net source base. In our following illustrations, these factors would appear as shifts in the supply and demand schedules.
A rise in market interest rates could result from either a shift in the credit supply curve, or a shift in the credit demand curve, or some combination of the two. The effect of a shift in the credit supply cun-e is shown in Figure I . The credit supply curve shifts from S~to 5-, and, in the resulting adjustment process, the interest rate rises to i 2 and bank credit outstanding falls to E~. Now let us look at an alternative explanation for the rise in market rates. Suppose that the rise in rates was clue to a shift in the public's demand for credit. This appears as a shift to the right of the public's demand curve from D 1 to D-1 , as shown in Figure   II .
At the market interest rate (i 1 ), the quantity of hank credit demanded by the public ( E 4 ) exceeds the amount of credit the banks are willing to supply (E 5
).
given the stock of base and the value of the bank credit multiplier. If the Federal Reserve System does not increase the growth rate of the net source base in response to the rise in interest rates, but permits market interest rates to adjust to clear the credit market, the interest rate rises toward i~. As the yields on loans and securities rise, the amount of the I ,ase, instead of in the ornitiplier. The money i mu Itipiicr assocmated with the net sou:-ee hasc is:
I-i-k = (r --h) (I ±t ±d) + k k and d, respectively, are the ratios of currency held hy the puhlie and tJS. Government deposits at connoercial hanks to the deniand deposit eo:nponcnt of the money stock. r, b, and t. respectively, are the ratios of hank reserves, member hank borrowings, and time deposits to commercial hank deposit liabilities (excluding interhank deposits Ti ii-rescue ratio, ( tl s rough the depen dci Ce of ha: :ks-derived excess reserves ) , the horrowm g ratio and thi' time deposi ratio are illI dept-nd emit upon credit n market in tcrest ratd's. credit banks are willing to supply rises', banks reduce their excess reserves, increase horro\\'ings from Fed' eral Reserve Banks, and raise the yields they offer to attract time deposits.~The new equilihnum quantitv of bank credit demanded and supplied is E::.
The pohevnsakers do not observe these supply and demand curves shifting up and down: all they observe is the increase in the reading on the market interest rate indicator. If the policvmakers believe 5\\ hethim h uk ci edit nu c 1st'. om died: c isis di pends Iipon the relationship between Regolation () ceiling rates and the yields banks oiler or: tune deposits. If banks are already at Regulation (~) ceilings, then an increase in the public's die-'ma: md h r credit i-es,:ltin g in a rise in nmar kit in merest rates nia'.' lead to dishmtermcdintio: s and a decrease in 1 mrmk crc dit.
the rise in market rates to ia represents a leftward shift ( decrease) in the credit supply curve, as in Figure 1 , and they desire no change in the influence of policy, they may now increase their purchases of securities to raise the level of free reserves. This policy action, according to the Market Interest Rate Hypothesis, would shift the credit supply curve to the right, from S. hack toward S~, and market yields would decline from i, back toward If, however, the rise in rates resulted from a rightward shift of the publics denandl for credit ( as shown in Figure II) . then to prevent market interest rates rising to i~,the Federal Reserve must expand the net source base enough to shift the banks' credit supply curve to 5:;, as shown in Figure III . At a market interest rate of i 1 , banks are now willing to supply a larger a: miount ( F ) of credit. Under these conditions, the operational policy of :'aising free reserves, which accelerates the growth of the base, results in a more rapid expansion of hank credit and none'. than would result in the situations ills :strated by Figures I and 11 .
Supporters of the Money Supph-I-lvpothesis assert that F'ederal Reserve actions shifting the credit supply i'urve would he self-defeating, if the rise in :narket rates reflected a shift in the public's demand cur'.-e. In a sitt:ation such as that illustrated bx' Figure III , the money stock expands very rapidly. The Money Supply Hypothesis predicts that market rates would onl~'temporarily remain at i 1 As the feedback effect of the rise in the money stock on total spending is reflected in the publics~1e:smand for credit shifting the de::iand curve further to the right), the Federal 
Implementing Policy Under Different Economic Conditions
This section illustrates how altc'rnative policy prescriptions i-an arise in s-esponse to changing economic cosal itions. Two diflere:mt sets of conditions are specified, and thd' mnonetary polic\:nakers are assumed to :nake a policy decision based upon this info:-snation.
Condition I
State of tIme econom : Time ecommomv is operating at
[mill emnplo~ment -Aim is creasing propom-tion of total spending is reflected ill rising prices. Commerci~dbanks have raisedl their ofi cring rates Oil time deposits to Regnlation Q ceiling rates, Policy decision: Polieymakers slmif t time locus of their atten tio mm fm-on real oil tps it a mid d': upi oyn sent to aeh ieyii m g stable prices,
Using the Market Interest Rate Hypothesis, policymakers reason that interest rates :nust be pushc~d higher to slow total spending and bring agg:'egate demand in line with the productive capacity of the economy. Consequently, the'.' adopt an operating strategy designed to raise market rates. This involves using policy instrtmnments to reduce the level of free reserves. The Trading Desk is instructed to "pursue open mnarket operations with a view to obtaining tightc-r money market conditions." The result of these open market actions is to decrease the growth rate of the base, which results in a slowing in the rate of expansion of tile money stork.
As market interest ratt-s continue to rise, banks can no longc-r eonspc'te for time deposits and disinter-:uediation begins. Consc-quentl~thc-amount of earning assets banks can holrl dc'elines. In restructuring their portfolios, banks attemnpt first to reduce their holdings of lowest-yielding assets. The tune sequence of this process would probably N' declines in their holdlings of short-ter:m m Coyenimmient securitic-s first. I~should also he sioterl that the Federal Reserve climes not make policy decisions in a vacouomm. At suet, timnes the Fede-ral Reserve may he inicier comisiderahle pnhi mc or gove' rno ient p:yssi Ire to e'ase its policy.
If the money stock is being used as an indicator, the rerlucerl growth rate of money' resulting from [he slowing in the rate of increase of the base also signals that the policymakers have begun to exert a less expansionarv influence on the ultimatr-policy' objceth'es. Ho\vd".-er. the supporters of the Money Supply I-Iypothesis would argue that the sharp rise in credit market interest rates -ann the "ahovr-ave'ragr' liquidity pressures in the financial market" do not necessarily signal the rlesirability' of a significant reversal of operating strategy. The key elements of a less expansionarv mnonetary-policy are a reduce-cl expansion of rlemand rieposits and hank credit, This is the necessary prelimimu'y to the clesirenl policy objectives of reduced aggregate dr-manrl and hence a reduced rate of increase of prices.
An analysis hasedl on the Mone\' S~spplyHypothesis agrees that a continued operational policy of restrir'ting the g'-owth s-ate of the base would, in the short-run, lead to higher le\-cls of market intr-rest rate-s. Over the intermnedliate-term, however, the resulting slower growth of the money stock woukl exert a dampr'ning influence on total spending. Tin-slowrlown in total spending would exercise a dampening inllud'nce on thr-upward pressure-s on prices''~tndl also lead to a reduction in the rid-mann 1 for d:redlit. Hence, pursuing such an operational target would, ac-co:-ding to this ha'pothesis. lead to lo\\er market interest rates and the desired ultimate policy objective of lower prices.
Con.ditioni. 2
Let us now assume tlvtt the policvmakers have engaged in~t set of polics' actions that resm,nlted in a slowing of d'eosmo: umic activity, l'Isis pern:mits''an analysis of the iii tphieations of dlifherr'mmt mm mrthonls of i mm mplemnenting polie's' in a i-ye 1 ical downtn rn.
State of the ec'ommomsm\ : The growtlm sate of real ontpot has been redmmeed well he-low its lo:sg-rmos potential. The lesel ol ummuensplovment has riseim above 5 per cent, Polur'v decision: Porsnm.' a :umonetary policy tlm~tt mesuIts ut au immereasedi growth rate of real ontpmit ititil hence a decreased ld'yel of m:sme:nplovmsieust.
In an r'eono,nie downturn, if the Fedleral Reserve uses tnarket interest rates as its indicator, it might conclude that the falling mnam'ket rates signal monetan' polin'y' has hr'co:oe "easier" than pre'.'iottsly. This interpretation dependls upon tIme condition that the dIecrease in intr-rest rates is resulting from a shift in the creilit supply curse. If the nleereasd' in intern'st rates reflects a nlecrease iu the (Ienmand for erenlit, then Federal Reserve policy may be "tighter" than previously. The fall in interest rates raises the banks' desired excess reserve ratio which operates to reduce the money multiplier. Also, if the downturn has been preceded by a "crunch" in the financial markets, this may also operate to raise banks' desired excess reserve ratio. If during the "crunch" the Federal Reserve exercised relatively' strict administration of the discount window, this factor would-lower the banks' desired ratio of borrowings to deposits. Therefore, the decline in the growth rate of money, resulting from a slower growth of the base, is reinforced by the fall in market interest rates.' 3 Hence, the monetary aggregates transmit the opposite infonnation, that policy actions are having more of a restrictive effect on the future movements of real output, employment and prices, A rise in the member banks' desired holdings of excess reserves, and a decrease in their borrowings from Federal Reserve banks, result in a rise in the level of free reserves. Under these conditions, to reduct the operational target of free reserves below its previous level, the Federal Reserve must engage in an even more aggressive policy of open market sales. The result is an even more rapid decrease in the net source base, and hence a further downward impetus on the money supply process.
This stage might be labeled the 'Let us turn it around"stage. As our previous discussion implies, the choice of an indicator and an operational target have important implications for the ability of the Federal Reserve to turn the economy around to a renewed period of expansion in the time period desired by the policymakers. To briefly outline the problems that might arise, let us assume that the policyinakers decide that to achieve their ultimate objectives the -money stock should increase at a more rapid rate.
However, although policymakers accept the growth rate of the money stock as their indicator, let us assume that policy is still implemented using the operational target of the Market Interest Rate Hypothesis. When judging the impact of day-to-day open market operations on the growth rate of money, the Trading Desk uses free reserves or, with equivalent results, the Federal funds rate. The growth rate of money is used to gauge the extent to which Federal Reserve actions are being converted into energy that will drive the economy upward. However, the flow of fuel is measured in free reserve units instead of in units of base. "The reader may refer to footnote 7, page 25, to See how these factors would lower the money multiplier.
Under the economic conditions set forth for this stage, the equilibrium level of free reserves would be expected to rise and the Federal funds rate would fall. If the monetary authorities are guided in their open market operations by either of these operational targets, they may be reluctant to pursue an aggressive policy of open market purchases. Therefore, the growth of the base may be slower than what is required to achieve the desired growth rate of the money stock.
The policymaker's failure to achieve some publicly announced growth rate of money does not mean that the Federal Reserve cannot control money. The failure to reach the desired monetary growth path may result from using an inappropriate operational target. As shown earlier, if the Federal Reserve tries to resist market-determined movements of interest rates, without taking adequate account of the influence of of these actions on the growth rate of the base, policymakers may not be able to achieve the growth of money they desire. The Federal Reserve can continue to we open market operations to smnooth short-run pressures in the financial markets arising from situations such as Treasury financings or a Cambodian Crisis. However, to control the growth rate of the money stock, it must consider the effect of these actions 01) the growth of the base, which dominates the intermediate-term growth rate of the money stock." Empirical evidence has been presented thatb y combining information about the past movements of money multiplier with a base operational target, the Federal Reserve can exercise reasonably close control over the intennediate-tenn growth rate of the money stock. 1S ummary This paper has presented a simplified explanation of the implementation problem of monetary policy. The actual implementation process is somewhat more complicated. For example, we assumed that the Federal Reserve had only one ultimate objective. In an actual situation its ability to achieve stable prices will be constrained by the effect that its policy actions have on employment. In our furnace analogy, this would be a case where the homeowner is concerned not only with the room temperature, but also with the relative humidity in the room. The speed with which the homeowner can increase the room "For a further discussion of this point, see MIan Meltzer, "Controlling Money." this Review (May 1989) Reserve to influence prices while maintaining a "tolerable level of emnplor-nlent will depend upon initial conditions, such as price cxpeetations. the price and employment response of producers to a decrease ill total spending, aml the structure of the labor market.
Monetary policy at pu-sent and in the foreseeable future must be inlplemen ted under conditions of less than perfect information about the structural relationships linking the eeonomv together. [he indicatoroperational target method uses existing knowledge to achieve efficient implementation of policy. This article has shown that the correct choice of an indicator. and an operating strategy for controlling that indicator, are important problems. If the Federal Reserve follosvs an indicator that is providing false information. then tins can have severe consequences for prices and employment.
Movements of nlarket mterest rates and the growth rate of the money stock frequently give conflicting information about the thrust of monetary policy. The possibilit-of conflict hetsveen proponents of these two indicators is greatest at times when it is most ililpOrtant that the Federal Reserve accurately assess tIle thrust of monetary policy actions. Tile operational strategy used to influence the level of market interest rates affects the relative expansionary or eontraetionarv influences tile Federal Reserve is exerting on the money supply process. If the Federal Reservẽ .attempts to ollset changes in levels of market interest rates that result from slnfts in tile publics demand for credit, then tIle growth rate of the base becomes endogenously determined. Under these conditions, the growth of tIle IiiOil~V stock reinforces expansions or contractions in total spending~t1ld ilence mno\-enlents in prices and employment. 
